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    • Update the HW_RANDOM_TPM check · 0ac5fe30
      Clip OS says that RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER and RANDOM_TRUST_CPU should be
      disabled if HW_RANDOM_TPM is enabled. The Clip OS description:
        Do not credit entropy included in Linux’s entropy pool when generated
        by the CPU manufacturer’s HWRNG, the bootloader or the UEFI firmware.
        Fast and robust initialization of Linux’s CSPRNG is instead achieved
        thanks to the TPM’s HWRNG.
      
      At the same time KSPP recommends to enable RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER and
      RANDOM_TRUST_CPU anyway:
        Get as much entropy as possible from external sources. The Chacha mixer
        isn't vulnerable to injected entropy, so even malicious sources
        should not cause problems.
      
      In this situation, I think kconfig-hardened-check should check
      only HW_RANDOM_TPM (there is no contradiction about it)
      and leave the decision about RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER and
      RANDOM_TRUST_CPU to the owner of the system.
      Alexander Popov authored